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Comments
A HAZY SHADE OF WINTER: THE CHILLING ISSUES
SURROUNDING HAZING IN SCHOOL SPORTS
AND THE LITIGATION THAT FOLLOWS
Immediately after spinning Ms. Hunt in circles, the Player Defendants ordered Ms. Hunt out of the room and commanded her to sprint down the field
while wearing a blindfold. Dizzy and disoriented, Ms. Hunt took off in a
dead sprint running parallel to the field, but no one stopped her. Instead
the Player Defendants shouted at her, commanding that she run faster. Ms.
Hunt complied with the orders to run faster. Unaware of where she was
running because of the blindfold, Ms. Hunt veered away from the field and
sprinted directly – face first – into a brick wall.1
I. INITIATION

INTO A

LIFETIME

OF

PAIN

In September of 2014, Haley Ellen Hunt, a former soccer
player at Clemson University, filed a lawsuit against the coach of the
women’s soccer team, the assistant coaches, and various university
officials and students.2 Hunt brought twelve claims, including civil
rights violations, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, all stemming from the hazing incident noted above, as well
as other conduct before and after the incident.3 Aside from the
emotional trauma, Hunt suffered a concussion, traumatic brain injury, a host of lacerations and bruises, and permanent damage to
her vision.4
When thinking about hazing, it is easy to assume that this issue
primarily exists within the context of fraternities and sororities;
however, one of the common, legal definitions of hazing is far more
inclusive, and fits all too comfortably with other areas of group
1. Complaint and Jury Demand at 49–51, Hunt v. Radwanski, No. 8:14-CV03640 (D.S.C. Sep. 12, 2014) (hereinafter the “Complaint”) (describing primary
hazing event suffered by plaintiff).
2. See id. at 3–23 (providing list of all defendants in case).
3. See id. at 83–180 (detailing causes of action against named defendants).
While not strictly the focus of the lawsuit, Ms. Hunt did provide a wealth of context
for the actions of the head coach, Eddie Radwanski. See id. at 29–35 (detailing
defendant’s “verbal hazing tactics,” such as threats to not play Ms. Hunt, to make
her time miserable, insulting her talent, and asserting that Ms. Hunt will be crying
on bench in two years).
4. See id. at 59–60, 81 (describing losses suffered by Ms. Hunt as result of hazing incident).
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membership, such as sports.5 While it is certainly true that much of
the media attention surrounding hazing has focused on Greek life,
there is a growing awareness of hazing in the context of school athletics.6 However, despite this increased focus on hazing in school
sports, there is still very little litigation—whether criminal or civil—
in comparison with the sheer prevalence of the issue.7
The rarity of anti-hazing litigation can seem odd when looking
at the frequency of hazing, particularly as most states have enacted
laws that prohibit hazing to one degree or another.8 Numerous
authors have posited different modifications to the laws and litigation theories aimed to combat hazing, yet these do not appear to
have made a significant difference.9
This Comment provides an overview on the issues underlying
the litigation of hazing in school sports. Part II addresses the statistics and factual background surrounding hazing, along with the legal backdrop, including an overview of the state laws against hazing.
5. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 786 (9th ed. 2009) (defining hazing as “[t]he
practice of physically or emotionally abusing newcomers to an organization as a
means of initiation”).
6. See generally Michael Winerip, When a Hazing Goes Very Wrong, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/15/education/edlife/a-hazing-at-cornell.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&; Bob Cook, Despite Greater Awareness, Violent Hazing Still a Problem in School Sports, FORBES (Sep. 9, 2013, 2:58 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/bobcook/2013/09/09/despite-greater-awareness-violenthazing-still-a-problem-in-school-sports/ (discussing ongoing problem of hazing
specifically in school athletics); College Hazing Statistics, INSIDE HAZING (2014),
http://insidehazing.com/statistics_25_college.php (noting statistics of hazing in
college athletics); Nicole Somers, Note, College and University Liability for the Dangerous yet Time-Honored Tradition of Hazing in Fraternities and Student Athletics, 33 J.C. &
U.L. 653 (2007) (discussing liability for hazing in context of both Greek life and
sports).
7. See generally Study: 80% of College Athletes Victims of Hazing, CNN (Aug.30,
1999, 7:25 PM), http://www.cnn.com/US/9908/30/sports.hazing/index.html?
eref=sitesearch (discussing results of comprehensive study on hazing); INSIDE HAZING, supra note 6 (noting extensive problem of hazing in college athletics); Brandon W. Chamberlin, Comment, “Am I my Brother’s Keeper?”: Reforming Criminal
Hazing Laws Based on Assumption of Care, 63 EMORY L.J. 925 (2014) (discussing
problems contributing to rarity of successful litigation in hazing cases).
8. See generally Amie Pelletier, Regulation of Rites: The Effect and Enforcement of
Current Anti-Hazing Statutes, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 377
(2002) (discussing scope and specifics of anti-hazing laws throughout nation);
States with Anti-Hazing Laws, STOP HAZING, http://www.stophazing.org/universitycollege-policies/states-with-anti-hazing-laws/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2015) (listing
each state with anti-hazing laws and providing text of relevant statutory provisions).
9. See generally William S. Friedlander, Fight Hazing in Court, TRIAL, Sept. 2014
(discussing strategies for successful litigation of hazing); Russell J. Davis & Anne E.
Melley, Liability Under Anti-Hazing Statute, 52 OHIO JUR. 3D GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY § 84 (2004) (discussing liability for crime of hazing); Scott R. Rosner and R.
Brian Crow, Institutional Liability for Hazing in Interscholastic Sports, 39 HOUS. L. REV.
275 (2002) (discussing ways to hold institutions liable for hazing).
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Part III discusses the problems inherent within pursuing a claim of
hazing in courts, particularly against schools and government employees. Part IV synthesizes the issues and discusses concerns and
strategies for lawmakers and litigants to deal with these issues.
II. A WINK

AND A

NOD: THE IMPLICIT APPROVAL

OF

HAZING

Hazing, even when limited to the context of school athletics, is
a vast topic. Accordingly, this Comment will provide as narrow a
focus as possible. Below, Section A discusses the prevalence of hazing, while Section B touches on state attempts to statutorily prohibit
and punish hazing.
A. Broken, Beat, and Scarred: The Prevalence of Hazing
Upon a cursory examination of hazing in school sports, it becomes immediately apparent that there are some disturbing statistics; for example, one study—from 1999—reports that “more than
250,000 students experienced some sort of hazing to join a college
athletic team.”10 This hazing does not always begin in college.
Forty-two percent of students who admitted to being hazed in college also reported that they were hazed in high school.11 More recently, one study showed that seventy-four percent of students
involved in varsity athletics were subjected to some form of hazing—meanwhile, seventy-three percent of students involved in a fraternity or sorority experienced hazing.12
In recent years, numerous incidents involving hazing have
emerged, bringing some small degree of parity between media attention and the prevalence of this issue.13 While logic might sug10. See INSIDE HAZING, supra note 6. This number is a projection from the
results of a smaller group of individuals polled, in which 80% were the victims of
“questionable or unacceptable activities as part of their initiation onto a collegiate
athletics team.” How Many Athletes Are Hazed?, ALFRED UNIV., http://www.alfred
.edu/sports_hazing/howmanystudents.cfm (last visited Nov. 1, 2015).
11. See ALFRED UNIV., supra note 10 (discussing when student athletes first experienced hazing).
12. See Elizabeth J. Allan & Mary Madden, HAZING IN VIEW: COLLEGE STUDENTS
AT RISK 16 (University of Maine, 2008), available at http://www.stophazing.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/hazing_in_view_web1.pdf (providing statistics for organizational hazing).
13. See generally Sports Hazing Incidents, ESPN (Jun. 3, 2002), https://espn.go
.com/otl/hazing/list.html (listing famous instances of hazing in sports); Stephen
Hudak, Drum Major Robert Champion’s Parents Settle with Bus Company, Driver in
FAMU Hazing Lawsuit, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Sep. 10, 2014, 5:42 PM), http://www
.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-famu-hazing-robert-champion-settlement-20140910-story.html (discussing hazing lawsuit); Amanda Lee Myers, Ohio
Boy’s Brain Injury Blamed on Football Hazing, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Feb. 5, 2014,
6:24 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2014/02/05/brain-in-
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gest that increased awareness of the harms associated with hazing
will instill caution in future athletes, one expert on hazing believes
that recent litigation will have no appreciable impact on how often
hazing occurs.14 While this litigation will inevitably have strong results with the individuals being sued – in the manner of specific
deterrence – it has weaker general deterrent capabilities.15
B. Paper Tigers Locked in a Cage: Anti-hazing Laws
Across the Nation
At present, forty-four states have criminalized hazing to one extent or another.16 One commentator summarized the general contents of anti-hazing laws as follows: “(1) a specified type of harm,
(2) that is connected to certain organizations or perpetrated
against a certain class of individuals (usually students), and (3) that
is perpetrated in certain contexts related to membership in the
organization.”17
In South Carolina, where Haley Ellen Hunt filed suit, there is a
generic prohibition against hazing as it relates to initiation into an
organization, complete with typical definitions of the physical and
psychological harm prohibited; however, a violation of this law only
constitutes a misdemeanor.18 South Carolina does, however, attach
liability for failure to report hazing, and explicitly forbids the use of
jury-blamed-on-football-hazing.html (discussing hazing lawsuit); Vernal Coleman,
Alleged Victim in Sayreville H.S. Hazing Scandal Threatens to File $1.5m Lawsuit Against
District, NJ.COM (Jan. 20, 2015, 11:15 AM), http://www.nj.com/middlesex/index.ssf/2015/01/alleged_victim_in_sayreville_hazing_to_file_15m_la.html (discussing hazing lawsuit).
14. See Hank Nuwer, Stopping Hazing in College and High School Athletics, ATHLETIC BUSINESS (Jul. 2014), http://www.athleticbusiness.com/athlete-safety/stopping-hazing-in-college-and-high-school-athletics.html (discussing findings and
conclusions of various studies and experts indicating poor prognosis for dissipation of hazing in near future).
15. See id. (noting poor likelihood of success in reducing future hazing incidents). David Westol, an expert on hazing, stated, “Undergraduates have a historical perspective of about six months. Combine that with the typical ‘It won’t
happen to me/us/our team’ mentality, plus other rationalizations, and we’ve
barely moved the needle.” Id.
16. See STOP HAZING, supra note 8 (listing states with anti-hazing laws).
17. Chamberlin, supra note 7, at 938 (listing three elements of hazing common between states). The commentator goes on to discuss the points where there
is less unanimity: “(1) the severity of the sanction imposed for the crime of hazing,
(2) whether the statute bars the defense that the victim consented to be hazed,
and (3) whether there are criminal penalties for the failure to report hazing.” Id.
(listing three elements with different conclusions in various states).
18. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-510 (2015) (providing definition and prohibition of hazing); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-530 (discussing classification and
penalty for hazing).
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consent as a defense.19 Interestingly, South Carolina also has explicit provisions allowing a range of punishments, including expulsion, for any student who engages in hazing in a public school or a
college – but limits hazing to actions taken by a “superior student”
against a “subordinate student.”20
South Carolina is not the only state to view failure to report as
a distinct offense.21 Prior to 2013, Illinois did not have a statutory
duty to report hazing; however, after two incidents in 2012 brought
national attention and an eventual acquittal of the perpetrating
coach in one incident, the Illinois legislature responded by requiring school officials to report hazing.22 The rule introduced criminal penalties that are often harsher than those felt by the
perpetrators of hazing, as it allows for up to one year of incarceration and $5,000 in fines – increasing to three years and $25,000 if
the incident results in significant injuries.23
By way of comparison, California likewise views hazing in general as a misdemeanor, unless it results in death or serious bodily
injury, in which case it can be a felony.24 While California does not
statutorily prohibit the affirmative defense of consent, it does provide for a distinct civil action for hazing, and permits a claimant to
file suit against any party involved in the hazing – students, school
officials, directors, and even the organization itself.25 Alternatively,
19. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-520 (criminalizing failure to report hazing); see
also S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-540 (noting expressly that consent is not applicable
defense to crime of hazing).
20. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-101-200 (discussing penalties specific to institutions of higher education); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-275 (discussing penalties specific to high schools).
21. Compare ALA. CODE § 16-1-23 (2015), ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 6-5-201-204
(2015), FLA. STAT. § 1006.63, 135 (2015), 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 12C-50.1
(2015), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, §§ 17-19 (2015), and N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
631:7 (2015), with S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-510–16-3-540, 59-63-275, 59-101-200
(criminalizing failure to report known instances of hazing).
22. See Mike Riopell, Suburban Hazing Scandals Spawn New Criminal Offense,
DAILY HERALD (Aug. 16, 2013, 7:44 PM), http://www.dailyherald.com/article/
20130816/news/708169714/ (discussing response to hazing incident by criminalizing failure to report). To be specific, the new legislation occurred before the
coach was acquitted, even though one of the charges was that he failed to report
the hazing incidents. See Jonathan Bullington and Lisa Black, Maine West Coach
Cleared in Case that Sparked Lawsuits, Anti-Hazing Law, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Jan. 16,
2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-01-16/news/chi-maine-westcoach-hazing-20140115_1_verdict-maine-west-high-school-education-law (discussing case against coach in hazing incident).
23. See Riopell, supra note 22 (discussing specifics of new Illinois law for failure to report hazing).
24. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 245.6 (West 2015) (providing classification and
penalties for crime of hazing).
25. See id. (providing explicit cause of action for civil hazing).
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this organizational liability takes a slightly different twist in Texas,
where an organization can be liable for hazing beyond the context
of a civil suit, and can be ordered to pay fines ranging from five to
ten thousand dollars.26
In addition to differing state approaches to punishing hazing,
the definition of hazing varies significantly among states, despite
many common trends.27 Arkansas has one of the broader definitions, which includes the typical fare of assault and coercion, but
goes further to include “the playing of abusive or truculent
tricks . . . by one (1) student . . . alone or acting with others, upon
another student to frighten or scare him or her.”28 This goes well
beyond what many states define as hazing; instead, it is common for
a state to require a minimum of reckless disregard for the health
and safety of another.29 Some states, such as Connecticut, use a
variation of the reckless endangerment standard, but also include
examples that might not ordinarily constitute disregard for health
and safety.30 In Oklahoma, the reckless endangerment standard includes not only physical safety, but also mental health and basic
dignity.31 By way of contrast, Ohio views hazing as a strict liability
offense, and recognizes a different animus from similar crimes such
as battery.32 Lastly, the majority of states limit hazing to students,
26. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.153 (West 2015) (providing criminal penalties for organizations found guilty of hazing offense).
27. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-5-201 (2015) (defining hazing as including
“The playing of abusive or truculent tricks on or off the property of any school,
college, university, or other educational institution in Arkansas by one (1) student . . . alone or acting with others, upon another student to frighten or scare
him or her”), with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-23a (2015) (providing examples of prohibited conduct, such as “Requiring indecent exposure of the body,” “Requiring
any activity that would subject the person to extreme mental stress, such as sleep
deprivation or extended isolation from social contact,” “Confinement of the person to unreasonably small, unventilated, unsanitary or unlighted areas,” and
others), and OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1190 (2015) (defining hazing as “an activity
which recklessly or intentionally endangers the mental health or physical health or
safety of a student for the purpose of initiation or admission into or affiliation with
any organization operating subject to the sanction of the public or private school
or of any institution of higher education in this state”).
28. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-5-201.
29. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-124 (2015) (defining hazing as “any activity by which a person recklessly endangers the health or safety of or causes a risk of
bodily injury to an individual”).
30. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-23a (defining hazing as “[r]equiring indecent
exposure of the body” and other examples).
31. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1190 (providing inclusive definition of hazing).
32. See State v. Brown, 630 N.E.2d 397, 402 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (discussing
implementation of state anti-hazing laws in practice in context of mens rea for
crime).
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while also construing hazing as occurring in reference to initiation
or continued membership in a distinct organization.33
Aside from criminalizing active hazing, various jurisdictions
have addressed the issue of third-party actors.34 In Ohio, the courts
noted that, “negligence, consent, and assumption of the risk by the
plaintiff are not defenses.”35 As an extension of that, the courts also
found that a school could not be liable under the state’s anti-hazing
statute by the mere fact of dealing with hazing in a “reactive” manner.36 Other states, such as Oregon, have extended liability to individuals involved with the leadership of student organizations; in
Oregon, coaches and advisers can be liable for hazing incidents
that occur within their organizations, even if they did not participate directly in the hazing incident.37
The following table is a general summary of how the states approach the criminalization of hazing. However, this representation
downplays the differences between the various states. While many
states share similar wording or approaches, other states have significant limitations on their statutes, which the general categorization
does not reflect.38 Regardless, the tabular representation emphasizes the disparate approaches of states, and demonstrates the scarcity of things such as statutorily approved civil causes of action for
hazing.39 It is also worth noting that some jurisdictions only permit
the prosecution of hazing incidents that occur in college, leaving
no criminalization for hazing occurring in high school or outside of
the scholastic setting.40
33. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 245.6 (West 2015) (limiting hazing liability to
actions taken in connection with initiation into student organization), S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-510 (2015) (including initiation, admission, and affiliation with student organization), COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-124 (defining hazing as only occurring
in context of student organizations).
34. See generally Duitch v. Canton City Schools, 809 N.E.2d 62 (Ohio Ct. App.
2004) (discussing liability of school actors when students perpetrated actual hazing
actions).
35. Id. at 67 (explaining legislative choice to preclude defenses).
36. See id. (refusing to extend liability to state actors without some form of
direct action contributing to issue).
37. See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.197 (2015) (providing explicit liability for actions
taken by state actors in hazing incidents).
38. See, e.g. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-607 (West 2015), KAN. STAT. ANN. §
21-5418 (2015), MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-105 (2015).
39. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 245.6 (West 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2307.44, 2903.31 (West 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 570j–570k (2015); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-56 (2015) (providing explicit civil cause of action for hazing).
40. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-23a (2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.375 (West
2015); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 578.360–578.365 (2015); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5351–5354
(West 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-123 (2015); WASH. REV. CODE § 28B-10-900-
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03 (2015); W. VA. CODE § 18-16-1-4 (2015) (defining hazing as only occurring in
higher education).
41. For the purposes of this table, third party liability means that someone
other than the individual who personally performed the act of hazing can be held
liable for hazing or a related crime.
42. For the purposes of this table, inchoate liability includes any form of conspiracy, inducement, attempt, or the like.
43. This statute does not create criminal liability, and is instead a directive on
school policy and procedure. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-2301 (2015).
44. This statute does not create criminal liability, and is instead a directive on
school policy and procedure. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.375 (West 2015).
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45. This statute does not create criminal liability, and is instead a directive on
school policy and procedure. See MINN. STAT. §§ 121A.69, 135A.155 (2015).
46. New Hampshire criminalizes failure to report by the victim of hazing, provided that the victim knowingly submitted to the hazing, as well as anyone present
for or who has knowledge of a hazing incident. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 631:7(II)(a)(2) (2015).
47. Oregon also permits liability for a student organization as a whole, including coaches and advisers; however, it does not permit liability for other actors, such
as school boards, who exist outside of the organization. See OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.197 (2015).
48. Under the plain language of the statute, consent is not a defense when
the victim is under the age of twenty-one; the statute does not state whether it is or
is not a defense when the victim is above that age. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5107.5 (West 2015).
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COURT

This section will focus on the scope of litigation and the school
responses to such, while also discussing issues surrounding the average attempt to litigate hazing. Section A will provide a brief summary of notable hazing cases, while Section B provides examples of
school responses. Section C introduces the problem of immunity,
and Section D discusses the problems and concerns involved in federal § 1983 claims.
A. Initiated into the Legal System
As noted above, Haley Ellen Hunt’s pending litigation is a significant case involving serious injury, and it is only one of the latest
49. See ALA. CODE § 16-1-23 (2015), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-2301 (2015),
ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 6-5-201–04 (2015), CAL. PENAL CODE § 245.6 (West 2015),
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-124 (2015), CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-23a (2015), DEL.
CODE ANN. TIT. 14, §§ 9301–04 (2015), FLA. STAT. §§ 1006.63, 135 (2015), GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-5-61 (2015), 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 12C-50.1 (2015), IND. CODE
§ 35-31.5-2-151 (2015), IOWA CODE § 708.10 (2015), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5418
(2015), KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.375 (West 2015), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:183,
1801 (2015), ME. REV. STAT. tit. 20-A, §§ 6553, 10004 (2015), MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 3-607 (West 2015), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, §§ 17–19 (2015), MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 750.441t (2015), MINN. STAT. §§ 121A.69, 135A.155 (2015), MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-105 (2015), MO. REV. STAT. §§ 578.360–65 (2015), NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 28-311.06–07 (2015), NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.605 (2015), N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 631:7 (2015), N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:40-3-4 (West 2015), N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 120.16–17 (McKinney 2015), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-35 (2015), N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-17-10 (2015), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.44, 2903.31 (West 2015), OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, § 1190 (2015), OR. REV. STAT. § 163.197 (2015), 24 PA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 5351–54 (West 2015), R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-21-1–3 (2015), S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-3-510–40, 59-63-275, 59-101-200 (2015), TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-123 (2015),
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 37.151-57 (West 2015), UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a-102,
76-5-107.5 (West 2015), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 570j–570k (2015), VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-56 (2015), WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 28B-10-900–03 (2015), W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18-16-1–4 (2015), WIS. STAT. § 948.51 (2015).
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in a long string of lawsuits over the years involving hazing in school
sports.50 Hunt’s case appears somewhat atypical given the extreme
consequences and the extent of the alleged involvement of the
coaching staff, as one might presume the typical hazing incident to
occur with, at most, a wink of the eye from the staff.51 In addition
to the facts of the incident noted previously, Hunt alleges significant actions—and inactions—on the part of the team staff, including what could amount to violations of several duties of care for the
coaches, assistant coaches, and trainers.52
Before Ms. Hunt filed her lawsuit, hazing was already in the
news; multiple lawsuits began and ended that same year, and all
involved varying degrees of hazing.53 One recent lawsuit, taking
place in Ohio, has a common thread with Ms. Hunt’s allegations:
the suit alleges permanent brain injury as a result of hazing.54 Unlike the incident at Clemson, this case involved minors on a high
school football team whose coach allegedly instructed some of the
players to hit other players as a form of punishment for their performance on a drill.55 When the victim named in the suit fell and
hit his head, the coach and an athletic trainer failed to provide
proper medical attention, despite observing signs of a concussion.56
This lawsuit emerged after the coach avoided facing criminal
charges, as a grand jury had declined to indict the coach.57
50. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 1 (summarizing allegations contained
within Complaint); see generally Hudak, supra note 13 (discussing recent hazing incidents); ESPN, supra note 13 (discussing somewhat older cases involving hazing);
Coleman, supra note 13 (discussing hazing litigation); Cook, supra note 6 (discussing hazing litigation).
51. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 114–62 (discussing significant injuries and
direct involvement of staff). Specifically, Ms. Hunt alleges that Coach Radwanski
not only knew and approved of the hazing incident, but that he gave the student
defendants the keys to the field and its facilities, thus providing access to the place
where the incident occurred. See id. at 40 (discussing allegations against coaching
staff defendants).
52. See id. at 155–58, 169–71 (claiming that team staff were involved in incident and failed to protect Ms. Hunt). One of the more troubling allegations is the
claim that, after the incident, the team staff failed to initiate a concussion protocol,
despite the fact that Ms. Hunt was showing clear signs of a concussion. See id. at
117 (discussing actions and inactions of coaching staff following hazing incident).
53. For a discussion of hazing incidents occurring in 2014, see generally infra
notes 54–64 and accompanying text.
54. See Myers, supra note 13 (discussing alleged medical consequences of hazing incident).
55. See id. (providing details of factual allegations pertaining to hazing
incident).
56. See id. (discussing team staff’s actions following hazing incident).
57. See Amulya Raghuveer, Woodmore Schools, Football Coaches Sued After Alleged
Hazing that led to Player’s Brain Injury, NBC 24 (Feb. 3, 2014, 4:23 PM), http://www

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016

11

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 5

222

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23: p. 211

By way of contrast, prosecutors in Florida indicted multiple students who beat a fellow student to death during an alleged hazing
incident, which had been part of the deceased student’s initiation
onto the college marching band.58 Several students accepted plea
agreements, with one sentenced to a year in jail, while others remain charged with such crimes as manslaughter over the incident.59 The parents of the deceased young man recently settled
with one party, while continuing their lawsuit against Florida A&M
University.60
While brain injuries and deaths are serious consequences of
hazing, they represent a single issue—namely, pronounced health
consequences—within a broad range of severe problems. A recent
California lawsuit raised allegations of sexual assaults occurring in
the showers of a high school football team.61 According to the
complaint, there is “a long-lasting tradition of ritual hazing and sadomasochistic sexual beatings undertaken by students, against students, which is encouraged, tolerated and sanctioned by teachers,
faculty, [and] coaches[.]”62 In a separate incident, this time occurring in Massachusetts, prosecutors indicted three high school athletes on rape charges, concerning an incident that occurred at a
sleepaway camp.63 While the case ultimately became a juvenile matter, there has not been any civil legal action taken on the issue at
this point.64
In addition to the cases occurring closer to when Ms. Hunt
filed her lawsuit, there were also two significant prior incidents,
both occurring in different Illinois high schools.65 Of these two
cases, one in particular – occurring at the Maine West High
.nbc24.com/news/story.aspx?id=1002364 (discussing results of grand jury investigation into coach’s behavior).
58. See Hudak, supra note 13 (discussing specific hazing incident and corresponding litigation regarding incident at FAMU).
59. See id. (summarizing criminal consequences to date for participants in fatal hazing incident).
60. See id. (noting continued process of hazing lawsuit).
61. See Lawsuit Claims High School Football Coaches Encouraged Hazing, Sexual Assault, CBS LOS ANGELES (Aug. 21, 2014, 5:47 PM), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/
2014/08/21/lawsuit-claims-high-school-football-coaches-encouraged-hazing-sexual-assault/ (discussing significant hazing incident).
62. Id. (quoting allegations filed in discussed lawsuit).
63. See Cook, supra note 6 (noting criminal charges over hazing allegations).
64. See Judge Rules Teen Sex Assault Case a Juvenile Matter, WBUR NEWS (Apr. 8,
2014), http://www.wbur.org/2014/04/08/sports-camp-rape-juvenile-court (relaying proceedings of criminal case involving hazing incident).
65. See Cook, supra note 6 (discussing hazing incidents occurring in close
proximity to each other in Illinois).
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School—resulted in both civil and criminal actions.66 According to
the civil suit, multiple incidents of sexual assault, including
sodomizing the victims with foreign objects, occurred under the supervision of the coach.67 While the lawsuit emerged in 2012, the
incidents in question happened as early as 2008, with the mother of
one of the victims informing the school of what had allegedly transpired.68 The coach was subsequently tried on charges related to
the incident, including failure to report, and was acquitted of all
counts in January of 2014.69
While there have been a number of hazing-related lawsuits
prior to Ms. Hunt’s action, she was not the last in this string of
litigation. In September of 2014, a line of hazing incidents allegedly occurred at a Sayreville, New Jersey high school, gaining relatively significant media attention.70 In a manner similar to the
California high school incident, the lawsuit raised allegations of sexual assaults perpetrated by and against students in the locker
room.71 The students, who were all players on the high school football team, allegedly penetrated younger players with fingers,
touched them in a sexual manner, and in one instance kicked one
of the victims.72 After the incident, the season was temporarily suspended, four members of the coaching staff were suspended with
pay and subsequently reinstated, the head coach was no longer with
the team, and seven players were charged as juveniles with various
crimes.73
B. How to Lose your Team in Ten Days:
School Responses to Hazing
While many hazing lawsuits include the school as a defendant,
thus requiring various actions and compensation as a result, some
66. See id. (discussing consequences of hazing incidents).
67. See Madhu Krishnamurthy, 3 More Maine West Families Join Hazing Lawsuit,
DAILY HERALD (Nov. 29, 2012, 3:16 PM), http://www.dailyherald.com/article/
20121128/news/711289766/ (discussing specific factual allegations of hazing
incident).
68. See id. (conveying partial timeline of events).
69. See Bullington, supra note 22 (discussing basis of charges and results after
criminal trial).
70. See Coleman, supra note 13 (discussing one of more prominent hazing
cases at Sayreville High School).
71. See id. (noting severe context of case beyond simple hazing).
72. See id. (describing alleged actions occurring in hazing incidents).
73. See Greg Tufaro, Sayreville Football Coach George Najjar Out After Scandal,
USA TODAY (Feb. 5, 2015), http://usatodayhss.com/2015/sayreville-footballcoach-george-sayreville-out-after-scandal (noting school response to hazing
allegations).
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schools have taken steps to deal with hazing before the victims even
have a chance to contact a lawyer, albeit to varying degrees of effectiveness.74 Cornell University experienced this twice in quick succession. In 2011, a fraternity brother named George Desdunes died
in a hazing incident, while in 2013 a far less physically serious incident of alcohol-related hazing occurred.75 In response to the former incident, Cornell promised to end hazing; toward that end,
they banned pledging, suspended several fraternities, and focused
on anonymous reporting for students.76 After the incident in 2013,
the school cancelled the entire season for the lacrosse team, claiming that it was “a team wide penalty for a team wide incident.”77
Likewise, the school administration at Humboldt State University
cancelled the men’s soccer season, following allegations of a hazing
party.78
While schools like Cornell and Humboldt have taken relatively
strong steps to address hazing, other schools have done little more
than pay lip service to the idea of prevention or punishment.79 The
hazing incident in a Massachusetts high school, which resulted in
criminal charges of rape for the perpetrators, prompted nothing
74. See generally Complaint, supra note 1, at 38 (noting that school technically
maintained anti-hazing policy but did not enforce it).
75. See Winerip, supra note 6 (discussing one incident occurring at Cornell
University); Oliver Staley and Scott Soshnick, Cornell Lacrosse Suspended by School
After Hazing Incident, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sep. 20, 2013, 8:56 PM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-20/cornell-men-s-lacrosse-suspendedby-school-after-hazing-case (discussing hazing at Cornell University). It is worth
noting as an aside that the 2011 Cornell incident would not have met the definition of collegiate hazing used in South Carolina for the purposes of school sanctions, where hazing requires a senior student to perform the actions against a
subordinate student. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-101-200 (2015) (providing definition
of hazing). The incident in Cornell was thus unusual in that the pledges kidnapped the senior fraternity brothers and forced them to drink, rather than the
other way around. See Winerip, supra note 6 (discussing specifics of hazing incident). As this happened in New York, three students were tried for hazing, and
were subsequently acquitted; the school itself was also charged, and did not defend
against the allegations. See also Ariel Kaminer, Former Cornell Students Acquitted of
Hazing in Death of Fraternity Member, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes
.com/2012/06/28/nyregion/ex-cornell-students-acquitted-of-hazing-in-death-offraternity-member.html (discussing litigation posture surrounding hazing
incident).
76. See Staley, supra note 75 (detailing school response to hazing incident).
77. Id.
78. See Dave O’Brien, Numerous Hazing Incidents Emerge, COLLEGE SPORTS BUSINESS NEWS (Sep. 17, 2012), http://collegesportsbusinessnews.com/issue/october2012/article/numerous-hazing-incidents-emerge (describing school response after
receiving reports of hazing incident).
79. Compare Staley, supra note 75 (discussing strong response to hazing made
by Cornell University), with Hudak, supra note 13 (describing generally poor response to hazing made by Florida A&M University).
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more than a statement that the school already had anti-hazing measures in place.80 After the death of the Florida A&M student, that
school asserted that it had preexisting policies against hazing and
that the deceased student had signed a pledge to oppose hazing,
yet had consented to the activity that resulted in his death.81
Despite the increased evidence of the prevalence and harmful
nature of hazing, not every university has responded to allegations
of hazing in even as positive a manner as discussed previously.82 In
2013, an alleged hazing incident occurred at Xavier University, resulting in one of the students receiving a concussion. The purported negligence of the soccer team staff led to significant medical
repercussions stemming from that incident, including memory and
vision issues, yet the university claims to have investigated the incident and found no evidence of wrongdoing.83 Later that year, the
university suspended the victim’s scholarship on the grounds of
“performance issues.”84 Even more troubling is the alleged conduct of the Siegel High School girls’ basketball team in Tennessee,
which resulted in the removal of players from the team after those
same students reported a hazing incident.85 While the school asserts that the hazing incident was not sexual in nature, as claimed
in the report, they do admit that the student responsible had been
disciplined—and that the students kicked from the team were only
removed because of repeated absences.86
C. Protecting the People Who Failed to Protect the Players
When Ms. Hunt filed her lawsuit, she included members of the
coaching staff and the school administration, raising various theo80. See Cook, supra note 6 (discussing poor response to hazing incident).
81. See Hudak, supra note 13 (noting school had ultimately shifted blame of
incident to victim).
82. See National Survey of Sports Teams: Introduction, ALFRED UNIV. (1999), http:/
/www.alfred.edu/sports_hazing/introduction.cfm (discussing significant cooperation of NCAA and NCAA institutions to discover prevalence and severity of
hazing).
83. See Eric Adelson, Xavier Sued by Former Soccer Player Claiming Negligence After
Concussion, YAHOO! SPORTS (Mar. 14, 2014, 11:22 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/
news/xavier-sued-by-former-soccer-player-claiming-negligence-152231797.html (reporting consequences and allegations deriving from hazing incident).
84. See id. (discussing extremely poor response to hazing allegations, which
included effectively penalizing player for consequences of injuries obtained during
hazing incident).
85. See Michael Gaio, Lawsuit: Girls Kicked off Team Over Hazing Complaints,
ATHLETIC BUSINESS (Sep. 2013), http://www.athleticbusiness.com/sportsmanship/
lawsuit-girls-kicked-off-team-over-hazing-complaints.html (reporting allegations
and response by school).
86. See id. (describing school justification for removing students from team).
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ries of liability against each of them.87 One of the hurdles that Ms.
Hunt, and anyone else seeking to sue school officials, must overcome is the problem of sovereign immunity: the longstanding doctrine that an individual can only sue the government—and in many
respects, the government’s agents—when the government makes a
statutory allowance for the given cause of action.88 This has already
emerged in the context of hazing; in Pelham v. Board of Regents of
Univ. Sys. Of Georgia,89 a student at Georgia Southern University and
member of the football team brought a suit against the college for
the actions of the football coach.90 The plaintiff raised claims of
negligence and negligence per se against the state university, utilizing
Georgia’s anti-hazing statute as the theory for the action.91 The
trial court dismissed the action on the grounds of sovereign immunity, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal.92 In upholding
the dismissal, the court reasoned that the legislature did not intend
to create civil liability with the criminal anti-hazing statute, and thus
the statute did not act as a waiver of sovereign immunity.93 The
court further held that, because the underlying actions constituted
assault and battery—and thus fell under one of the statutory exceptions precluding governmental liability—the plaintiff could not
recover.94
Aside from proving civil liability, some jurisdictions permit
plaintiffs to overcome sovereign immunity by demonstrating “actual
malice” on the part of the defendant.95 In Caldwell v. Griffin Spalding County Bd. of Educ.,96 a plaintiff brought a suit against the school
board, the coach of the football team, and other government employees over a hazing incident.97 The court found that sovereign
87. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 114–62 (listing causes of action against
coaching staff and administration).
88. See JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK, AND BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY,
TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 466, 476 (3d ed. 2012) (describing general principles of sovereign immunity).
89. Pelham v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 743 S.E.2d 469 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2013).
90. See id. at 471 (describing context of lawsuit).
91. See id. (outlining plaintiff’s claims against college).
92. See id. at 474 (discussing outcome of case).
93. See id. at 471–72 (justifying decision to grant summary judgment by looking to legislative intent).
94. See id. at 472–73 (discussing Georgia statute defining exceptions to waiver
of sovereign immunity).
95. See Caldwell v. Griffin Spalding Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 503 S.E.2d 43, 44 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1998) (noting potential avenues for overcoming protection of sovereign
immunity in civil action).
96. 503 S.E.2d 43 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
97. See id. at 44 (discussing context of civil litigation).
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immunity shielded the defendants because of their lack of knowledge of the underlying incident and because they acted with implied malice at the most, not the requisite actual malice to
overcome their immunity.98
One subset or term for sovereign immunity is that of qualified
immunity, in which government employees enjoy protection
against claims made “for acts in the performance of discretionary
functions that were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.”99 In Travis v. Stockstill,100 the plaintiff filed a § 1983
claim against the coach and other officials of his high school, alleging that the defendants allowed other students to commit acts of
hazing against the plaintiff.101 Considering the issue of qualified
immunity raised by the defendants, the court reasoned that the
school—and by extension, its agents—had no affirmative duty to
prevent an incident without notice of its occurrence, and thus qualified immunity existed.102 In support of the defendants’ lack of
knowledge, the court stated, “[t]his single incident on January 29,
2011, is insufficient to establish a pattern, custom, or practice of
Defendants ignoring hazing activity.”103
While courts have applied various standards for permitting exceptions to sovereign immunity, legislature itself has also contributed to the creation and scope of this exception.104 In Vinicky v.
Pristas,105 another lawsuit raised against government employees
over a hazing incident, the defendants similarly attempted to claim
sovereign immunity.106 However, Ohio had previously enacted legislation that provided an exception to that immunity “when civil
liability is expressly imposed upon the political subdivision by a section of the Revised Code . . . .”107 Accordingly, the court found that

98. See id. at 45 (justifying grant of summary judgment by engaging in analysis
of actions allegedly creating liability for hazing incident).
99. Travis v. Stockstill, No. 1:12CV173 HSO-RHW, 2013 WL 5204669, at *1, *2
(S.D. Miss. Sep. 13, 2013).
100. No. 1:12CV173 HSO-RHW, 2013 WL 5204669 (S.D. Miss. Sep. 13, 2013).
101. See id. at *3 (discussing factual allegations underlying civil litigation).
102. See id. at *4 (discussing necessary elements for finding liability creating
exception to qualified immunity).
103. Id.
104. See Vinicky v. Pristas, 839 N.E.2d 88, 91–92 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (noting
clear provision for civil liability created by state legislature).
105. 839 N.E.2d 88 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
106. See id. at 90 (discussing background of case).
107. Id. at 93.
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an exception existed, as Ohio’s anti-hazing statute provided for explicit civil liability against educational institutions.108
D. The Spirit of § 1983
When filing a lawsuit against a governmental entity or employee, one of the common approaches is to look for a § 1983
claim.109 In the context of hazing, a student can bring a § 1983
lawsuit against schools and school officials, as hazing violates a constitutional right to bodily integrity.110 However, the ability to hold
public officials liable for actions taken in the course of their official
duties is not absolute, even without the issue of sovereign immunity.111 There are two primary categories of incidents where a hazing victim might sue a school official: when the official was involved
directly with the hazing incident and when the official failed to prevent the hazing incident.112 Regardless of which option a plaintiff
takes, “[t]here are two essential elements that must be explored in
examining a § 1983 claim: ‘(1) whether the conduct complained of
was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2)
whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.’”113
In bringing suit against a state actor who was involved in the
hazing incident as a participant, a plaintiff must prove the basic
elements of a § 1983 claim, while also proving that “the supervisor
personally participate[d] in the alleged constitutional violation.”114
The clearest way for an individual to participate in an incident is to
demonstrate that they performed the prohibited acts themselves,
108. See id. at 93 (referencing Ohio statute to justify finding civil liability despite claim of sovereign immunity).
109. See Michael A. Zwibelman, Why Title IX Does Not Preclude Section 1983
Claims, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465, 1466 (1998) (noting frequency of § 1983 claims
against government entities).
110. See Rosner, supra note 9, at 280–82 (discussing general theory behind
§ 1983 claims).
111. See generally Meeker v. Edmunson, 415 F.3d 317 (4th Cir. 2005) (discussing limitations on § 1983 claims); see also Alton v. Hopgood, 994 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.
Tex. 1998) (discussing limitations on § 1983 claims).
112. Compare Meeker, 415 F.3d at 322 (extending direct involvement to include
use of others to accomplish result), with Alton, 994 F. Supp. at 834 (discussing
possible liability for failure to act).
113. Key v. Mott, No. 12-0614-KD-M, 2013 WL 1827253, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Apr.
4, 2013) (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)) (establishing elements of § 1983 claim).
114. See Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990).
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accomplishing a constitutional violation with their own hands.115
Additionally, participation can occur when the actor authorizes
others to perform the physical actions.116 In Meeker v. Edmunson,117
the Fourth Circuit analyzed the dismissal of a case brought against a
school coach in the context of hazing incidents.118 There, the
Fourth Circuit accepted as true the plaintiff’s contention that the
coach “used students as his ‘instruments’ to abuse [the plaintiff].”119 Accordingly, the court found that this was sufficient to
constitute direct action on the part of the coach, and ruled that
these facts permitted the plaintiff to succeed under § 1983.120 The
Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion when it stated that a
“‘plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional
conduct of the offending subordinate.’”121
The other method of proving a violation is significantly more
difficult, and has its own separate analysis and considerations.122
From the outset, § 1983 does not permit vicarious liability, and thus
any claim that does not involve direct action will be significantly
more difficult to pursue.123 It is equally true that liability of third
parties, particularly in the context of school officials, is a matter
that is closely related to the issue of qualified immunity.124 Defend115. See Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 614 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding that direct
application of force by state actor against victim constitutes personal violation of
constitutional rights).
116. See Meeker, 415 F.3d at 322 (finding liability despite lack of direct action
on part of defendant).
117. 415 F.3d 317 (4th Cir. 2005).
118. See id. at 319 (describing coach’s alleged actions as “instituting and encouraging repeated beatings of the student by other members of the team”).
119. Id. at 322.
120. See id. at 323 (finding claim of constitutional violation available for plaintiff). The Fourth Circuit reached its conclusion after interpreting Hall, and stated,
“Hall thus teaches that even allegations that a school official ‘authorized’ (rather
than instituted or encouraged) malicious corporal punishment suffice to state a
claim against that official for a constitutional violation.” Id. (citation omitted).
121. Doe v. Claiborne Cnty, 103 F.3d 495, 511 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845
(1984)). However, in this specific case, the Sixth Circuit found that the members
of the school board did not have any particular supervisory authority over the
teacher—and could not act independently regardless—and thus did not violate a
duty to act. See id. (detailing outcome of case and underlying reasoning).
122. See, e.g., Alton v. Hopgood, 994 F. Supp. 827, 835–37 (engaging in
lengthy analysis of liability for failure to prevent hazing).
123. See generally id. at 835 (noting inapplicability of vicarious liability in
§ 1983 claims); see also Doe, 103 F.3d at 509 (engaging in analysis to determine if
liability exists for failure to act).
124. See generally Alton 994 F. Supp. at 834–35 (analyzing qualified immunity
of nonstudent defendants).
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ing against the claim of a constitutional violation and that qualified
immunity applies can share many of the same considerations.125 In
raising a defense, officials can argue that a reasonable individual in
the shoes of the defendants “could have concluded that their actions, both collectively and individually, would prevent constitutional violations.”126 Liability is more likely to attach when the
defendants had credible information of a substantial problem and
then failed to act on that information.127
In the context of § 1983, the Third Circuit emphasized the Supreme Court’s holding that third-party state actors can be liable for
injuries caused by another when the “defendants, with deliberate
indifference to the consequences, [establish] and [maintain] a policy, practice or custom which directly [causes a] constitutional
harm.”128 Other courts have addressed this theory of inaction.129
The Sixth Circuit listed the elements a plaintiff must prove to succeed on this theory:
(1) the existence of a clear and persistent pattern of . . .
abuse by school employees; (2) notice or constructive notice on the part of the School Board; (3) the School
Board’s tacit approval of the unconstitutional conduct,
such that their deliberate indifference in their failure to
act can be said to amount to an official policy of inaction;
and (4) that the School Board’s custom was the ‘moving
125. See generally id. at 834–37 (analyzing issue of qualified immunity under
context of § 1983 claim); for a discussion on qualified immunity, see supra notes
99–108 and accompanying text.
126. Alton, 994 F. Supp. at 836.
127. See id. at 837 (analyzing knowledge and actions of third-party actors in
hazing incident and concluding that, “There is simply insufficient evidence in this
case which reveals that the nonstudent Defendants learned of facts or a pattern of
inappropriate behavior that would lead a reasonable official to conclude that
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights would be, or were being, violated.”); see also Doe, 103
F.3d at 507 (finding liability must attach to school board when it fails to address
custom that leads to abuse).
128. Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989);
see also Chisler v. Johnston, No. 09-1282, 2010 WL 1257458, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Mar.
29, 2010) (discussing in context of analysis for supervisory liability). “At a minimum, such liability attaches ‘only where there are both (1) contemporaneous
knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of similar
incidents, and (2) circumstances under which the supervisor’s inaction could be
found to have communicated a message of approval to the offending
subordinate.’ ” Chisler, 2010 WL 1257458, at *10 (quoting Colburn v. Upper Darby
Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 673 (3d Cir. 1988)).
129. See, e.g., Doe, 103 F.3d at 508 (engaging in analysis of liability for failure
to act).
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force’ or direct causal link in the constitutional
deprivation.130
1.

Living La Vida in Loco Parentis

In some instances, plaintiffs have attempted to use the general
status of schools as operating in loco parentis to create a special relationship, which thus requires action to prevent harm perpetrated
by another.131 This argument notably fails when attempting to hold
school officials liable for actions occurring at a university or other
advanced education facility.132 Some jurisdictions, such as the Fifth
Circuit, have explicitly held that this relationship does not exist between schools and students, even in K-12 settings.133 The strength
of the in loco parentis theory of liability suffered a critical blow when
the Supreme Court decided DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of
Social Services,134 holding that states cannot be liable for third-party
injuries unless the state placed the individual in harm’s way and
removed their ability to protect themselves.135
After DeShaney, states that had previously recognized the theory
of in loco parentis as creating liability for schools began to shy away
from that determination.136 Regardless of any hesitancy, the Third
Circuit attempted to distinguish DeShaney on the facts and the Supreme Court’s own words by emphasizing the liability that attaches
when a state actor, rather than a private individual, deprives a plaintiff of their constitutional rights.137 This reasoning is not universal
130. Id.
131. See generally J.D. v. Picayune Sch. Dist., No. 1:11 CV514-LG-JMR, 2013 WL
2145734, at *5 (S.D. Miss. May 15, 2013) (attempting to utilize theory of in loco
parentis to create liability for school).
132. See generally Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 139–40 (3rd Cir. 1979)
(giving lengthy recounting of movement away from in loco parentis standard for
higher education).
133. See id. (declining to utilize in loco parentis to justify theory of liability for
schools).
134. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
135. See id. at 198–99 (discussing extent of state liability). The Supreme
Court recognized only two instances where this sort of relationship existed and
mandated care—incarceration and involuntary commitment to a mental institution—while leaving open the possibility of extending it to children placed in foster
care. See id. (limiting application of relationship to specific instances).
136. See generally Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 723–24
(3d Cir. 1989) (noting previous ruling of special relationship while expressing concern over its reasonableness after DeShaney).
137. See id. at 724–25; see also Brown v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 456 Fed. App’x 88
(3d Cir. 2011) (finding no liability for school officials when individuals who committed assault were private actors).
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by any means.138 In Doe v. Claiborne County.,139 the Sixth Circuit
heard a case in which a teacher allegedly raped and sexually assaulted a student.140 The court declined to extend DeShaney to hold
the school district liable, reasoning that “[t]he Due Process Clause
does not impose an affirmative constitutional duty on the School
Board to assume the responsibility of protecting its students against
the unconstitutional acts of its employees.”141
The Ninth Circuit also engaged in an analysis of state liability
for failure to protect a school student.142 In Patel v. Kent School District,143 the Ninth Circuit noted that a plaintiff can prevail against a
state actor for failure to prevent injury when the special relationship exception exists, but limited that exception to circumstances
where the state actively deprived the plaintiff of liberty.144 That
court rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that mandatory school attendance and the theory of in loco parentis created a special relationship.145 It is also worth noting that, unlike the incident examined
by the Third Circuit, a private actor caused the harm in Patel, and
that the state’s alleged liability stemmed from inadequate measures
taken to protect the victim.146
2.

State-created Danger Zones

The other exception raised by plaintiffs is the theory of the
state-created danger.147 The Ninth Circuit established the elements
of that claim as applying “only where there is ‘affirmative conduct
on the part of the state in placing the plaintiff in danger’ . . . [and]
only where the state acts with ‘deliberate indifference’ to a ‘known
138. See generally Doe v. Claiborne Cnty, 103 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing alternative reasoning for holding state actor liable).
139. 103 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1996).
140. See id. at 500 (discussing factual allegations in case).
141. Id. at 510.
142. See Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 972–74 (9th Cir. 2011) (analyzing failure-to-act case in context of in loco parentis).
143. 648 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2011).
144. See id. at 972 (discussing special relationship considerations under context of DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)).
145. See id. at 972–73 (discussing plaintiff’s theory and noting that “[a]t least
seven circuits have held that compulsory school attendance alone is insufficient to
invoke the special-relationship exception.”). The court continued by stating that
“most of these circuits have expressly held that combining in loco parentis duties
with compulsory school attendance still does not create a ‘special relationship.’ ”
Id. at 973 (citation omitted).
146. See id. at 970 (recounting factual allegations of case and noting that student committed acts in question, while principal allegedly failed to protect victim).
147. See generally Patel, 648 F.3d. at 974 (discussing case in context of “statecreated danger” theory).
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or obvious danger.’”148 Under Ninth Circuit jurisprudence, this is
a steep standard, as it “is even higher than gross negligence—deliberate indifference requires a culpable mental state.”149 Furthermore, while deliberate indifference relies upon the facts, it is not
strictly a jury question.150 The Ninth Circuit is not alone in viewing
the state-created danger exception as a significant hurdle.151 In the
Third Circuit, the elements of proving a state-created danger are
even stronger and more fact-intensive than in the Ninth Circuit.152
The standard used in the Third Circuit also precludes omissions or
failures to act, and instead requires some affirmative action taken
by a state actor before liability can attach.153
Strict requirements and affirmative action are not the only interpretations of the state-created danger exception.154 The Second
Circuit has forcefully distinguished itself from other circuits, and
noted that they do not conflate state-created dangers with special
relationships, and instead find that “liability arises from the relationship between the state and the private assailant.”155 Despite this
attempt to approach state-created danger in a distinct manner, the
Second Circuit does not regard a failure to step in and protect an
148. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting and synthesizing Munger v. Glasgow Police Dept., 227 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000) and L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894,
900 (9th Cir. 1996)).
149. Id.
150. See id. at 975 (discussing previous instances where deliberate indifference
theory proceeded to trial and distinguishing them to justify summary judgment in
instant case).
151. See generally Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty, 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir.
2006) (analyzing strict requirements of state-created dangers).
152. Compare, e.g., Patel, 648 F.3d 965, with Bright, 443 F.3d 276, 281 (listing
elements of state-created danger exception). Specifically, the Third Circuit requires a plaintiff to prove that:
(1) ‘the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct;’ (2) a
state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience;
(3) a relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that
‘the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant’s acts,’ or a ‘member of a discrete class of persons subjected to the potential harm brought
about by the state’s actions,’ as opposed to a member of the public in
general; and (4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a
way that created a danger to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more
vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all.
Id. (citations omitted).
153. See id. at 282 (noting with particularity that plaintiff must prove overt
action, rather than inaction, to meet elements of state-created danger).
154. See generally Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2005). The Second
Circuit notably deviated from stricter levels of culpability by permitting a showing
of “deliberate indifference” when state actors have time to consider the implications of their actions, or lack thereof, and decide upon the proper course of action. Id. at 114 (discussing culpability element of state-created danger exception).
155. Id. at 109.
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individual as sufficient for meeting the burden of proof.156 However, it does recognize that liability can attach when a supervisor
encourages or gives active permission to the state actor to engage in
a course of conduct that would lead to creating a dangerous situation or environment.157 Other jurisdictions have been even more
reluctant to adopt the full strength of the state-created danger exception, to the point that the Fifth Circuit refuses to consider it an
actual exception.158 Aside from refusing to permit a § 1983 claim
under that theory, the Fifth Circuit has also stated that it cannot be
the basis for overriding otherwise valid sovereign immunity.159
IV. HAZED

SUED: RESTORING DIGNITY
COURT OF LAW

AND THEN
IN A

Hazing litigation currently encompasses a vast array of
strengths and weaknesses. Some states employ laws and jurisprudence that make it easier to hold individuals and schools accountable, while other states have built a bulwark of immunity and
reduced liability around school officials.160 Given the extreme
prevalence and severity of this issue, states need to address their
laws as they relate to both students and school officials, while also
focusing on aspects that are common between them.161 This section will discuss each of these areas, and will include information
on where current practices can succeed, what must be done to increase the likelihood of success, and where the challenges
remain.162
A. Flightless Birds of a Feather
If nothing else, the forty-four states with hazing laws all have
one thing in common: they all use the word “hazing” to describe
156. See id. at 109–10 (discussing when state-created danger does not apply).
157. See id. at 110–11 (discussing when state-created danger exists under context of supervision of state actors).
158. See, e.g., Saenz v. City of McAllen, 396 Fed. App’x 173, 177 (5th Cir.
2010) (refusing to adopt explicit exception and noting multiple opportunities
where Fifth Circuit could have, but did not, adopt exception).
159. See id. at 178 (finding insufficient support for state-created danger exception to overcome claim of immunity).
160. For further discussion of anti-hazing laws and immunity, see supra notes
16–49, 87–108 and accompanying text.
161. For a discussion on common hazing activities, see supra notes 10–15 and
accompanying text (explaining prevalence of hazing).
162. For a discussion on the general nature of anti-hazing laws, see supra
notes 16–49 and accompanying text.
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the prohibited conduct.163 Sadly, that is the extent of their similarities.164 Of course, there are commonalities between a number of
states; however, as this Comment discusses below, it is rare for even
half of the states to enjoy surface similarities, let alone substantive
likenesses.
1. “Sticks and Stones Can Break my Bones,” but Words Can Avoid
Criminal Penalties
Regardless of who the perpetrator, facilitator, or instigator of a
hazing incident might be, there is one necessary component before
any criminal or civil liability can attach: harm.165 In the case of Ms.
Hunt, her experiences with hazing resulted in significant and permanent physical damage, emotional harm, and the loss of many
activities that she had once enjoyed.166 Under South Carolina’s
anti-hazing statute, however, the defendants in that case could only
face criminal liability for the physical injuries, as hazing only includes “acts which have a foreseeable potential for causing physical
harm to a person.”167 This is true for any of the defendants in Ms.
Hunt’s case, whether they are students or school officials, as every
form of liability—including failure to report—flows from that narrow definition of hazing as risking physical harm.168 South Carolina is not alone in this regard; by way of example, Maryland only
recognizes an act as hazing when it “subjects a student to the risk of
serious bodily injury,” without any regard for non-serious injury or
non-physical injury at all.169
The definition of hazing as being limited to physical injury is
misinformed, and likely stems from the stereotypes surrounding
Hollywood depictions of hazing.170 Instead, hazing involves a range
of mental, emotional, and social harms, in addition to the risk of
physical harm.171 According to a comprehensive study on hazing,
163. See generally supra note 49 (listing all states with anti-hazing statutes).
164. See id.
165. See Chamberlin, supra note 7, at 938 (noting element of harm as common factor between anti-hazing statutes).
166. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 82 (describing injuries suffered due to
hazing incident).
167. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-510 (2015).
168. See id. (providing strict definition of hazing).
169. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-607 (West 2015).
170. See Allan, supra note 12, at 14 (noting that “students often associate hazing with Greek-letter organizations explaining that hazing is [sic] ‘. . . things I have
seen on TV with fraternities and sororities and paddling and stuff.’ ”).
171. See id. (defining hazing as “any activity . . . that humiliates, degrades,
abuses, or endangers” a student).
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the most prevalent act involves consumption of alcohol; while this
certainly presents risk of physical harm, it is not the only hazing act
that occurs in schools.172 The second most common act involves
singing or chanting at a time and place that is unrelated to a groupspecific event, such as a game—an act that has virtually no risk of
physical injury, yet depending upon the circumstances and the content, can produce any manner of embarrassment or emotional
harm.173 Other common hazing acts include limitations on the
ability to associate, sleep deprivation, verbal abuse, sudden interruption of sleep, sex acts, and the like, all of which can potentially
occur without physical harm.174
Out of the forty-four states that have enacted anti-hazing laws,
just over half recognize that hazing can constitute more than actual
or potential physical harm.175 Arkansas is rare in the fact that it not
only recognizes the possibility of non-physical harm, but also distinguishes between different types of harm altogether in a manner
that is inclusive of the broad spectrum of hazing.176 Unfortunately,
not every state is as enlightened as Arkansas when it comes to haz172. See id. at 17 (listing twelve most common hazing acts between all respondents and noting frequency of drinking games as twenty-six percent).
173. See id. (noting prevalence of singing requirement as seventeen percent).
174. See id. (listing other common hazing acts).
175. See ALA. CODE § 16-1-23 (2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-2301 (2015);
ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 6-5-201–6-5-204 (2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-23a (2015);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§9301–04 (2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917 (2015); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.375 (West 2015); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:183, 17:1801
(2015); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 20, §§ 6553, 10004 (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269,
§§ 17–19 (2015); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 578.360–578.365 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
28-311.06–28-311.07 (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:7 (2015); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-17-10 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.44, 2903.31 (West 2015);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1190 (2015); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5351–5354 (West 2015);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-21-1–11-21-3 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-123 (2015);
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 37.151-57 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a102, 76-5-107.5 (West 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 570j-570k (2015); WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 28B.10.900–28B.10.903 (2015); W. VA. CODE §§ 18-16-1–18-16-1
(2015) (providing liability for non-physical harms, such as mental or emotional
harm).
176. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 6-5-201 (defining what constitutes hazing). Specifically, Arkansas separates hazing acts and consequences by paragraph; the first paragraph includes “intimidating the student attacked by threatening him or her with
social or other ostracism or of submitting such student to ignominy, shame, or
disgrace among his or her fellow students, and acts calculated to produce such
results.” Id. The second paragraph states that hazing can involve “[t]he playing of
abusive or truculent tricks on or off the property of any school, college, university,
or other educational institution in Arkansas by one (1) student . . . alone or acting
with others, upon another student to frighten or scare him or her.” Id. Third,
hazing includes:
[Acts] done for the purpose of humbling the pride, stifling the ambition,
or impairing the courage of the student attacked or to discourage him or
her from remaining in that school, college, university, or other educa-
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ing. Utah’s definition includes any act that “would subject the individual to extreme mental stress, such as sleep deprivation, extended
isolation from social contact, or conduct that subjects another to
extreme embarrassment, shame, or humiliation.”177 Utah does not
appear to recognize any act of hazing that would produce only
moderate or even substantial mental, emotional, or social harm,
preferring instead to criminalize “extreme” harm.178
2.

A Hazy Environment

While the issue of harm is clearly relevant when analyzing the
results of a hazing incident, it is also relevant in determining the
intended consequences of the act, thus creating meaningful inchoate liability.179 Inchoate liability is a longstanding tradition in criminal law, and can encompass actions taken across a greater period
of time, rather than focusing on the specific instances where action
resulted in harm.180 The actions that create liability are not those
that create the harm directly, but instead attempt to bring about
the harm in one manner or another.181
In the context of hazing, not every individual will hold the paddle, give the command to drink, or yell at the victim.182 In the case
of Ms. Hunt, an unknown number of senior students kidnapped
her and other freshmen, drove them around, spun her in circles,
tional institution, or reasonably to cause him or her to leave the institution rather than submit to such acts.
Id. Fourth and finally, Arkansas includes physical harm:
[S]triking, beating, bruising, or maiming; or seriously offering, threatening, or attempting to strike, beat, bruise, or maim; or to do or seriously
offer, threaten, or attempt to do physical violence to any student of any
such educational institution; or any assault upon any such student made
for the purpose of committing any of the acts, or producing any of the
results, to such student as defined in this section.
Id.
177. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-107.5 (providing definition of hazing).
178. See id. (limiting harm to that which is “extreme” in nature).
179. See Manuel A. Utset, Inchoate Crimes Revisited: A Behavioral Economics Approach, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1205 (2013) (describing inchoate liability as intending
and acting to create harm but failing to do so).
180. See id. (describing philosophical considerations of inchoate liability, including greater leeway and length of time for liability to attach).
181. See id. at 1207 (describing inchoate liability as encompassing solicitation,
attempt, and conspiracy).
182. See generally Pelham v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 743 S.E.2d
469 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (finding it likely that defendant probably liable for hazing
but ultimately upholding sovereign immunity to bar claim); see also Meeker v.
Edmunson, 415 F.3d 317 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding defendant potentially liable for
hazing due to use of students as “instrumentality” of crime).
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and ordered her to run.183 Because of the nature of the event, it is
highly unlikely for Ms. Hunt to know who blindfolded her, who
drove the car, and who yelled the orders.184 Under a strict reading
of liability, only the person or persons who did those things to Ms.
Hunt directly would be liable, as the other students did not touch
Ms. Hunt, give her orders, or otherwise interact with her.185
Under a theory of inchoate liability, however, the students—
and in this case, the coach—can all be held liable for the actions of
their confederates.186 There, the coach likely solicited the hazing
incident by “delegat[ing] its execution to a second party,” which
creates liability for solicitation.187 If any of the student defendants
assisted in procuring the vehicles, the blindfolds, the keys to the
field, or other elements used in the hazing incident, then they
could be liable for attempt, as they took substantial steps toward
committing the crime.188 Lastly, the mere agreement to carry out
the hazing incident would be sufficient to create liability under a
theory of conspiracy, as criminal liability attaches upon the creation
of a common criminal plan.189
There is nothing to state that an individual cannot be found
guilty of conspiracy to commit hazing under the ordinary criminal
laws of the jurisdiction.190 The very nature of inchoate liability
holds individuals accountable for their actions that would be criminal if successful, and does not require explicit statutory allowances
for inchoate liability.191 Instead, the problem arises from the fact
that inchoate liability has its own standards and requirements,
which may or may not reflect the realities of hazing in an adequate
and accurate manner—particularly given the abstract nature of hazing and its associated culture.192
Likewise, civil conspiracy—the joint and several liability of coconspirators with varying degrees of fault—is not a standalone
183. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 42–50 (describing hazing event).
184. See id. (describing disorientation and confusion surrounding hazing
event).
185. See id. (noting presence of other victims and senior students).
186. See id. (discussing hazing incident).
187. See Utset, supra note 179, at 1211 (discussing crime of solicitation).
188. See id. at 1212–14 (discussing crime of attempt).
189. See id. at 1213–14 (discussing crime of conspiracy).
190. See generally In re Khalil H., 910 N.Y.S.2d 553 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (upholding juvenile adjudication for conspiracy and attempted hazing).
191. See generally Utset, supra note 179, at 1209 (discussing inchoate liability in
modern criminal law).
192. See generally Nuwer, supra note 14 (discussing culture surrounding
hazing).
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claim, and requires the completion of a tort before a plaintiff can
win using it as a theory of liability.193 When basing a claim on a
theory such as negligence per se through the violation of an anti-hazing statute, this can be problematic when the anti-hazing statute is
so deficient as to preclude the specific type of harm suffered.194
Other elements of the state’s tort law could be deficient, which
would leave the victim with no redress if the statute does not provide express inchoate liability.195
Interestingly, the number of states that do not recognize inchoate liability in the explicit context of hazing is equal to the number
of states that do not recognize emotional harm—however, the
states themselves are different, meaning that there is little deficiency in any given state.196
3.

Instrumentalities of an Initiation Master

The issue of third-party liability is closely related to inchoate
liability, as it often manifests in the form of accomplice liability—
the theory that an individual is liable for the actions of another that
occur as part of a common scheme or because the accomplice
aided the principal.197 While there are numerous approaches to
holding an individual liable for the harm caused by another, the
one adopted by the Model Penal Code requires a purpose of perpetuating the act, and actions such as soliciting, aiding, or failing to
193. See Norman L. Greene, Civil Conspiracy and the Rule of Law: A Proposal for
Reappraisal and Reform, 64 ARK. L. REV. 301, 331–32 (2011) (discussing general requirements of civil conspiracy).
194. For further discussion of negligence per se in the context of hazing, see
infra notes 212–21 and accompanying text.
195. See Greene, supra note 193, at 331–32 (noting requirement of independent tort in majority of jurisdictions before civil conspiracy liability attaches).
196. See ALA. CODE § 16-1-23 (2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15–2301
(2015); ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 6-5-201–204 (2015); CAL. PENAL CODE § 245.6 (West
2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-124 (2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-23a (2015);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 9301–9304 (2015); FLA. STAT. §§ 1006.63, 1006.135
(2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-61 (2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917 (2015); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-5418 (2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.375 (West 2015); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17.183, 17.1801 (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, §§ 17–19 (2015);
MINN. STAT. §§ 121A.69, 135A.155 (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:7 (2015);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:40-3–2C:404 (West 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-35 (2015);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-21-1–11-21-3 (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-510–16-3-540,
59-63-275, 59-101-200 (2015); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 37.151–37.157 (West
2015); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a-102, 76-5-107.5 (West 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
16, §§ 570j–570k (2015); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28B-10-900–28B-1–903 (2015) (finding some form of inchoate liability for hazing).
197. See generally John F. Decker, The Mental State Requirement for Accomplice Liability in American Criminal Law, 60 S.C.L. REV. 237, 245 (2008) (describing general
accomplice liability).
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attempt to prevent the act.198 This encompasses a critical part of
anti-hazing laws, as the failure to act in prevention of hazing is an
issue that this Comment will address in Part IV-c.
Under a plain reading of the various anti-hazing statutes, excluding a duty to report, only seventeen states recognize third-party
liability for hazing.199 As with everything else, this liability has incredible variation within the statutory language of the different
states. Massachusetts only recognizes third-party liability for “principal organizers,” while Rhode Island includes both organizers and
participants—without defining who constitutes a participant.200
Texas, which has found its anti-hazing statute unconstitutional for
personal liability of a coach in failing to prevent hazing, permits
third-party liability for the organization when “the organization
condones or encourages hazing or if an officer or any combination
of members, pledges, or alumni of the organization commits or assists in the commission of hazing.”201
Some states take the failure to permit third-party liability a step
further in the wrong direction, and require the perpetrator to be a
student—thus precluding all criminal liability from non-student actors, regardless of their level of involvement.202 This requirement
of a student actor has the potential for ambiguity in some states,
particularly in the context of sports; by way of example, Idaho defines hazing as actions or conspiracies perpetrated by a “student or
member of a . . . student organization.”203 There is no indication as
to whether a coach, athletic director, trainer, or other school official constitutes a member of such an organization, and thus while
198. See id. (listing Model Penal Code requirements for accomplice liability).
199. See ALA. CODE § 16-1-23; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-2301; ARK. CODE.
ANN. §§ 6-5-201–6-5-204; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
17.183, 17.1801; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, §§ 17–19; MINN. STAT. §§ 121A.69,
135A.155; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:7; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:40-3–2C:40-4; N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-35; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.44, 2903.31 (West 2015); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 11-21-1–11-21-3; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-510–16-3-540, 59-63-275, 59101-200; TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 37.151–37.157; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a102, 76-5-107.5; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 570j–570k; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28B-10900–28B-10-903 (providing some form of third-party liability for hazing).
200. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 17 (defining third-party liability),
with R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-21-1 (defining third-party liability).
201. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.153 (describing organizational liability); see
Texas v. Zascavage, 216 S.W.3d 495 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (finding personal liability
statute unconstitutional on face and as applied in regard to high school wrestling
coach).
202. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-2301; ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 6-5-201–6-5-204;
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-35; OR. REV. STAT. § 163.197
(2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-123 (2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 570j–570k
(requiring perpetrator of hazing to be student).
203. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917(4) (defining who is liable for hazing).
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Idaho permits general third-party liability, they could limit that liability to third-party student actors only.204
4.

The Punchline to the Bad Joke of Anti-Hazing Laws

The comprehensive reports that have emerged regarding the
prevalence of hazing demonstrate that this is a national issue. It
does not matter where the student lives; hazing on sports teams can
occur anywhere.205 Students regularly cross state and county lines
to attend colleges, which means that even someone who might
know the laws and culture of their own state could find themselves
in an unexpectedly difficult situation once they research their destination—something that happened to Ms. Hunt, albeit to a lesser
degree.206 Aside from the obvious issues of states with inferior antihazing laws, which limit whatever effectiveness they might have in
dealing with the problem, the need for uniformity in the adequacy
of such laws is paramount.207
This need is so great that one commentator advocated the creation of a federal anti-hazing statute, which would track ideal language cherry-picked from across the country and provide a
comprehensive standard for hazing.208 This proposed model would
condition the receipt of federal funds for schools on enforcement
of its provisions, thus requiring compliance from virtually every college and university.209 While the author of that proposal did not
discuss this concept in the context of a § 1983 claim, such a statute
could easily include an express provision that any act falling under
the statute’s definition of liability for hazing, when perpetrated by a
government employee, would expose the school and the employee
to federal civil rights liability.210
204. See id. (giving definition that does not explain who qualifies as members
of student organizations).
205. See generally Allan, supra note 12, at 8–11 (discussing national prevalence
of hazing).
206. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 26–27 (describing Ms. Hunt’s offers from
universities across the country and her ultimate decision to attend Clemson).
207. See Joshua A. Sussberg, Note, Shattered Dreams: Hazing in College Athletics,
24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1421, 1480–82 (2003) (discussing need for national uniformity in anti-hazing laws).
208. See id. at 1482–88 (detailing proposed federal anti-hazing law).
209. See id. at 1488 (discussing connection between funding and enforcement
of proposed legislation).
210. For further discussion of the difficulties surrounding § 1983 claims
against school officials, see supra notes 109–59 and accompanying text.
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B. Students, Sue Thy Peers
As noted previously, some states only recognize students as liable for acts of hazing, which creates a host of issues for both criminal and civil litigation on this issue.211 Regardless of the direct
applicability of a state’s anti-hazing statute, there are certain considerations that are only or primarily relevant to students when examining hazing in school sports, whether because of the issues of
relationships, immunity, or otherwise, as discussed below.
1. Hazing per se Is Negligence per se
When holding students accountable for hazing, one of the possible options involves negligence per se—the theory of liability that
uses violation of an established duty or prohibition, such as a criminal statute, to impart civil liability for the same or similar conduct.212 Civil liability flows from criminal statutes in two distinct
ways: it can establish strong evidence of liability and/or provide an
accepted framework for proving the violation of a breach of a duty
of care.213
It is a matter of no controversy that criminal actions involve
stricter protections for defendants and a higher burden of proof
than their civil counterparts do, even when the underlying facts are
identical.214 Accordingly, once an individual has been found guilty
of hazing, that conviction is admissible in many jurisdictions as evidence of the underlying facts, even if it does not rise to the level of
estoppel.215 By focusing on criminal prosecutions for hazing, states
can shoulder the greater weight of the burden and allow private
citizens to benefit without added expense; this seems justified, as
the peculiar nature of school sports lends itself to some form of
quasi-parental liability on the part of the government.216
211. For further discussion of the theory negligence per se as it pertains to hazing, see supra notes 197–204 and accompanying text.
212. See Friedlander, supra note 9, at 24 (describing use of negligence per se in
context of hazing).
213. See generally W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Convictions or Acquittal as Evidence
of the Facts on Which it was Based in Civil Action, 18 A.L.R.2d 1287 (2015) (noting
growing use of criminal conviction as admissible evidence for underlying facts in
civil context); GOLDBERG, supra note 88, at 365 (discussing use of negligence per se to
satisfy breach element of common law negligence).
214. See Shipley, supra note 213 (noting relative level of burdens between
criminal and civil cases).
215. See id. (describing use of criminal convictions in civil context).
216. Cf. Chamberlin, supra note 7 (arguing for revision of criminal anti-hazing statutes to reflect theory of assumption of care). While this article references
assumption of care on the part of students involved in hazing, the same philosophical rationale—abandonment or violation of a voluntarily assumed trust—applies
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Even when a state chooses not to increase prosecution for hazing violations, the existence of a strong, inclusive anti-hazing statute
will still benefit civil litigation.217 Negligence per se allows a “plaintiff
to satisfy the breach element of her cause of action by proving that
the defendant violated a certain kind of statutory rule of conduct[.]”218 This eliminates the need to provide general proof of
breach under typical negligence requirements, and instead creates
a particularized standard that is inherently applicable to the cause
of action in question.219 The related value of negligence per se is that
it allows a plaintiff to sidestep the problem of a state failing to create a distinct civil cause of action for hazing, as the underlying facts
giving rise to a general negligence claim will likely mirror the standard in the criminal statute.220 While there are other requirements
for utilizing a theory of negligence per se, these are also easily dealt
with when the criminal statute is adequate and addresses the reality
of hazing.221
2.

Immunizing the “Eye” in “Team”

The issue of reporting involves three intertwining issues: secrecy, protection for reporting, and criminal penalties for not reporting.222 By its very nature, hazing involves a strict code of silence
and veil of secrecy; rituals often occur at night, in secluded locations, and with little to no adult supervision.223 Before litigation
can happen, someone needs to blow the whistle on the hazing;
before a court can find liability, there must be sufficient evidence to
support that conclusion.224 In an effort to increase reporting, seven
states have enacted criminal penalties for knowing about a hazing
to an even greater degree when placing the weight of that duty on schools,
coaches, and other responsible adults. See id. at 963–64 (describing rationale behind proposed reform of criminal anti-hazing statutes).
217. See GOLDBERG, supra note 88, at 365 (discussing use of negligence per se to
satisfy breach element of common law negligence).
218. Id. at 375.
219. See id. (describing use and value of negligence per se in civil actions).
220. See id. at 377 (describing application of negligence per se).
221. See id. (noting other requirements for negligence per se, such as statute
intended to prevent harm and that plaintiff is in class of individuals intended to
benefit from statute).
222. See generally Pelletier, supra note 8, at 381–83 (discussing issues surrounding reporting of hazing incidents).
223. See generally Chamberlin, supra note 7, at 958 (describing underground
nature of hazing).
224. See Pelletier, supra note 8, at 381–83 (discussing problem of secrecy as
barrier to criminal prosecution for hazing).
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incident but failing to report it to the proper authorities.225 While
this has potential value, some commentators believe that such a
statute is at best useless and at worst will only work to “drive hazing
underground.”226
Despite the valid concerns surrounding reporting requirements, there is a genuine need for a strong mechanism to induce
reporting—even if the mechanism only succeeds in encouraging
the worst of the victims or the least involved member of the organization to speak out, it will still succeed in shedding light on a grossly
underreported phenomenon.227 The creation of anonymous reporting systems is one way to remove the potential stigma of reporting; by allowing information to come forward without a name—and
any testimony that followed would be in the same context of a subpoena, identical for reporters and non-reporters alike.228
Another potential approach, which no state has adopted thus
far and no commentators appear to have considered, would be to
institute mandatory reporting only against leaders, instigators, and/
or the responsible adults. Instead of requiring a student athlete to
sell out his or her fellows wholesale, this limited reporting requirement could at a minimum require students to inform schools of the
actions of the coaches and athletic directors.229 While there is inevitably a sense of loyalty between the two, there are certainly situations where the victims of coach-directed hazing would be more
willing to speak out against the adult tormentor than one of their
fellow students.230
225. See ALA. CODE § 16-1-23 (2015); ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 6-5-201–6-5-204
(2015); FLA. STAT. §§ 1006.63, 1006.135 (2015); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 12C-50;
12C-50.1 (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, §§ 17-19 (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
631:7 (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-510–40, 59-63-275, 59-101-200 (2015)
(criminalizing failure to report known instances of hazing).
226. See; Chamberlin, supra note 7, at 958 (discussing risks associated with
increased criminal liability surrounding hazing); see also Pelletier, supra note 8, at
381–83 (noting that mandatory reporting statute “fails to address the most probable reason for failure to report: that the hazing victim does not want to ‘rock the
boat,’ become a whistle blower, or jeopardize their membership”).
227. See Somers, supra note 6, at 673–75 (discussing sheer prevalence of underreporting of hazing in school sports).
228. See Rosner, supra note 9, at 298 (emphasizing need for anonymous reporting systems in schools).
229. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 73 (noting that school officials only became involved because Ms. Hunt’s parents contacted them; she did not report
incident herself). It is unclear from the Complaint how much Ms. Hunt knew
about the law and the school policies surrounding hazing and reporting hazing;
however, it is at least possible that, had Ms. Hunt known that she had a duty to
report the coach, but not her fellow players, she would have done so.
230. Cf. Complaint, supra note 1, at 31–35 (detailing longevity and severity of
cruelty on part of coach against plaintiff).
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While reporting requirements are useful for gaining the requisite information to succeed in anti-hazing litigation, they have a
more practical value for litigants: incentive to cooperate and testify
once the information has already been reported.231 Once a deposition or trial testimony reveals that the student knew about the hazing and failed to report it, then that individual could face criminal
penalties, and at a minimum could face punishment from the
school; however, the possibility of waiver or immunity should remain an option.232 Grants of immunity or refusals to prosecute are
some of the most common tools used by prosecutors to secure cooperation from criminal defendants, and they are equally valuable
in the civil context by dropping a party from a suit in exchange for
information.233
C. I’m Hazed for Teacher
As a team-based cultural phenomenon, hazing exists as a
means to create an apparent atmosphere of trust and camaraderie,
often at the expense of safety or personal dignity.234 According to
one leading commentator, true camaraderie is the product of interaction with previous generations, which benefits from the accumulated wisdom and experience of such individuals.235 Accordingly, it
appears logical that the rehabilitation of the hazing culture will not
focus on the students themselves—particularly given their short
memories—but on the coaches, directors, and former players.236
Likewise, the existence of a code of silence surrounding nearly any
incident of hazing makes it less likely that a student, whether a victim or a perpetrator, will voluntarily come forward to discuss the
issue.237
231. See Rosner, supra note 9, at 298 (theorizing that students would be more
cooperative if they did not risk penalties of their own).
232. See Chamberlin, supra note 7, at 954–55 (discussing immunity in context
of criminalized failure to report hazing).
233. See Ian Weinstein, Note, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV.
563, 569–70 (1999) (discussing prevalence and value of providing assistance to
prosecutors in exchange for more favorable outcomes on criminal charges).
234. See Nuwer, supra note 14 (describing hazing as “giv[ing] athletes a quickfix bonding,” where “the drawbacks often outweigh the perks”).
235. See id. (discussing and quoting opinion of Norm Pollard, coauthor of
Alfred University hazing study).
236. See id. (quoting hazing consultant David Westol that undergraduate students “have a historical perspective of about six months” and noting importance of
staff and senior alums in creating healthy culture).
237. See Susan Lipkins, PREVENTING HAZING: HOW PARENTS, TEACHERS, AND
COACHES CAN STOP THE VIOLENCE, HARASSMENT, AND HUMILIATION 86 (2006) (noting and discussing difficulty for victims in breaking “code of silence” around hazing incidents).
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As noted previously, out of the forty-four states with anti-hazing
laws, six require the perpetrator to be students.238 Only eighteen
states permit liability for third-party actors, such as those who encourage or facilitate hazing.239 This leaves twenty-six states with
criminal statutes forbidding hazing and no direct means of enforcing them against the coaching staff, athletic directors, or other leaders of sports team unless those individuals personally raised their
hand to perpetrate an act of hazing.240 While the direction of hazing is sufficient to meet the definition of action under a § 1983
claim, there is no guarantee as to how any given state would view
direction when their own statutes only reference direct action taken
to accomplish an act of hazing.241
1.

Mandated Reporting and What to Do with the Reports

Given the position of trust bestowed upon coaches and other
adults on sports teams, the requirement to report hazing is critical;
however, only seven states criminalize the failure to report hazing
on the part of team staff.242 As noted previously, there are genuine
concerns involved in requiring a student to report hazing—very few
of which exist or have adequate justification when looking at this
problem on the part of school employees.243 Particularly in the
238. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-2301 (2015); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 6-5-201
(West 2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917 (West 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1435 (West 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-123 (West 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§§ 570j–570k (West 2015) (defining individual liable for hazing as student actor).
239. See ALA. CODE § 16-1-23 (2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-2301; ARK.
CODE. ANN. §§ 6-5-201–6-5-204 (West 2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917; LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17:183, 17:1801 (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, §§ 17–19 (2015);
MINN. STAT. §§ 121A.69, 135A.155 (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:7 (2015);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:40-3–2C:40-4 (West 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-35; OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.44, 2903.31 (West 2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-21-1–11-213 (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-510–16-3-40, 59-63-275, 59-101-200 (2015); TEX.
EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 37.151–37.157 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a-102,
76-5-107.5 (West 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 570j–570k; WASH. REV. CODE §§
28B-10-900 – 28B-10-903 (2015) (extending some form of liability to actors not
directly involved in hazing incident).
240. See generally IND. CODE § 35-31.5-2-151 (2015) (utilizing definition of
criminal recklessness for definition of hazing and not permitting liability for anyone but direct actor).
241. See Meeker v. Edmunson, 415 F.3d 317, 322 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding liability when coach used others as “instruments” of crime).
242. See ALA. CODE § 16-1-23; ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 6-5-201–6-5-204; FLA. STAT.
§ 1006.63 (2015); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 12C-50; 50.1 (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 269, § 17-19; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:7; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-510–3-51040, 59-63-275, 59-101-200 (criminalizing failure to report known instances of
hazing).
243. For further discussion on requiring students to report hazing, see supra
notes 211–21 and accompanying text.
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wake of Jerry Sandusky and the Penn State scandal, there is little
question that governments must require school officials to report
acts of abuse, particularly when they involve minors.244 Penn State
left the nation scrambling to reform its reporting requirements for
child sexual abuse, which is certainly an admirable goal, but it is not
the only thing that deserves mandatory reporting.245 Regardless of
whether a state recognizes the doctrine of in loco parentis or the
state-created danger to permit civil liability for failing to prevent
hazing, both of those rationales should at a minimum serve to justify mandated reporting of any credible belief of hazing that occurs
in the context of school sports.246
Criminalizing and creating civil liability for failing to report
hazing is only one side of the problem; the other is that there must
be an applicable standard of care for investigating and dealing with
reports of hazing.247 In the case of Ms. Hunt, a substantial portion
of her allegations involved what happened after the hazing incident, particularly in regard to how the school dealt with the reports—and lack thereof—that it had received.248 After learning of
Ms. Hunt’s significant injuries, the athletic department at Clemson
began an investigation, which included meeting with the coaching
staff of the soccer team.249 According to the Complaint, “[t]he
Clemson Administrator Defendants ultimately concluded, despite
receiving reports that the Clemson Coach Defendants authorized
the hazing ritual and tried to cover up their involvement, that no
penalties would be imposed . . . as a result of the incident.”250
Ms. Hunt’s allegations did not end there. As per the Complaint, the Clemson Office of Community and Ethical Standards
(“OCES”) began an investigation following pressure by Ms. Hunt’s
parents.251 OCES made a number of findings, including determining that the coaching staff had authorized the hazing incident, and
244. See Erica M. Kelly, Note, The Jerry Sandusky Effect: Child Abuse Reporting
Laws Should no Longer be “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 209, 210 (2013)
(discussing rapid reevaluation of reporting laws following Sandusky scandal).
245. See id. at 214–15 (discussing national response to Jerry Sandusky child
abuse scandal, including vast attempts to reform mandatory reporting laws).
246. For further discussion of in loco parentis and the state-created danger rule
in the context of hazing, see supra notes 131–159 and accompanying text.
247. See Rosner, supra note 9, at 297 (emphasizing need for schools to investigate reports of hazing).
248. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 69–78 (detailing factual allegations pertaining to school’s actions and inactions following hazing incident).
249. See id. at 70–71 (relaying sequence of events following hazing incident).
250. Id. at 72.
251. See id. at 73–74 (noting events following school’s refusal to administer
penalties for hazing incident).
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that members of the team had violated Clemson’s policies against
hazing.252 Despite this finding, the response by OCES was minimal:
it placed the team on probation, required attendance at an antihazing workshop, and did not notify Ms. Hunt of the results of their
investigation.253 Regardless of any problems with the sufficiency of
the OCES response to the hazing incident, the differences between
its findings and actions and those taken by the school administration underscore the need for uniformity in necessary standards of
care.254
Even putting aside the fact that some employee of the university should have reported even his or her suspicions of hazing, the
school’s response fell well below any reasonable standard of care.255
Borrowing from the philosophical underpinnings of the special relationship exception, once a school is on notice that there is a problem, it has a far greater duty to act to mitigate the damage and
prevent it from happening again.256 The existence of an implicit
policy condoning the improper activity can be enough to open the
door to liability in some jurisdictions. The existence of such a policy only finds support when a school knows about a problem, has
credible accusations of misconduct, and then fails to do anything
about it.257
2.

Legal Ramifications for Non-Student Ritual Masters

It is not enough for educational facilities to regulate student
organizations; there must be legal responsibility placed on coaches
and schools for what occurs in sports teams, or else there will be
little motivation for positive change.258 While official policy is naturally going to disavow any knowledge of hazing, except for those
rare cases where disciplinary action followed soon after, the reality
is that roughly one-quarter of hazing incidents occur with the
252. See id. at 74–75 (discussing results of OCES investigation).
253. See id. at 76–78 (discussing OCES responses pertaining to findings of
investigation).
254. See id. at 69–78 (discussing different approaches taken by school administration and OCES following hazing incident).
255. See id. at 72 (noting school’s refusal to sanction those involved in hazing
incident, including school employees).
256. See generally Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 728–29
(3d Cir. 1989) (noting with disapproval school district’s failure to reprimand
teachers accused of sexual misconduct with students across period of years).
257. See id. (finding school board’s failure to act on complaints both troubling and indicative of a policy of permitting improper behavior).
258. See Friedlander, supra note 9, at 23 (noting that colleges typically disclaim legal responsibility for hazing).
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knowledge of coaches and other adult leaders.259 In some of the
cases discussed previously, coaches not only knew about the hazing
incidents that were occurring in the context of the team, but had
ordered or orchestrated that hazing.260 In other cases, the coaches
were arguably uninvolved, but either failed to prevent the incident
or did little to nothing after the fact to deal with the problem.261
For all of the reasons discussed previously, criminal liability for
coaches is unlikely in all but the most egregious of circumstances, at
which point prosecutors will likely charge something other than
hazing.262 Instead of criminal liability, the way to hold coaches accountable is through civil action—however, once more, this has significant problems. Unlike students, who have little to no protection
against tort claims beyond whatever defenses may be relevant to
their case, coaches can hide behind the governmental immunity of
the school to preclude liability.263 Various methods of inchoate
and third-party liability may or may not be sufficient to overcome
immunity, as they have diverse standards that a plaintiff must meet
to succeed.264
As per the general trend of inadequate anti-hazing statutes,
only four states have an explicit civil cause of action for hazing.265
However, even this number is misleading, as the specific causes of
action tend to be limited in nature.266 In Virginia, civil liability for
hazing only attaches when bodily injury occurs; this tracks the criminal liability, of course, as Virginia does not recognize emotional or
social harm in their statute.267 By way of contrast, Ohio has an ideal
259. See Allan, supra note 12, at 25 (discussing belief by students that coaches
were aware of hazing incidents).
260. See generally Complaint, supra note 1, at 40 (discussing alleged active involvement of coaching staff in hazing incident).
261. See generally Travis v. Stockstill, No. 1:12CV173, 2013 WL 5204669 (S.D.
Miss. Sep. 13, 2013) (discussing allegations of hazing for permitting students to
haze victim); Alton v. Hopgood, 994 F. Supp. 827 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (discussing
alleged liability for failure to prevent hazing incidents).
262. See Pelletier, supra note 8, at 409 (discussing minimal criminal penalties
for hazing and resulting ineffectiveness of such laws in criminal context).
263. For a discussion on sovereign immunity in the context of hazing, see
supra notes 87–108 and accompanying text.
264. For further discussion on the hurdles inherent within sovereign immunity, see supra notes 87–108 and accompanying text.
265. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 245.6 (West 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2307.44, 2903.31 (West 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 570j–570k (2015); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-56 (2015) (providing explicit civil cause of action for hazing).
266. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 245.6 (West 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2307.44, 2903.31; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 570j–570k; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-56
(providing generally limited means or forms of recovery for hazing).
267. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-56 (defining civil cause of action for hazing).
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civil cause of action, which exhaustively details who is liable and
under what circumstances, and includes non-physical harm.268
The problem with so many states lacking explicit civil liability is
that sovereign immunity stands as a barrier unless the government
waives it.269 In Pelham, the defendant school board succeeded in its
motion for summary judgment on the grounds of sovereign immunity.270 While there was a colorable claim that the school board
violated Georgia’s anti-hazing statute, the case at bar was civil, not
criminal, and thus probable guilt under the criminal statute did not
create a civil cause of action in its own right.271 This would likely be
irrelevant if the defendant was a non-government entity or employee, yet because they were a branch of the government, sovereign immunity existed unless the legislature chose to waive it—
something that had not occurred in that case.272
Pelham is valuable in demonstrating the other primary flaw deriving from a lack of explicit civil liability: the exception of certain
268. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.44 (detailing civil cause of action).
Ohio’s civil liability statute states, in full:
Any person who is subjected to hazing, as defined in division (A) of section 2903.31 of the Revised Code, may commence a civil action for injury
or damages, including mental and physical pain and suffering, that result
from the hazing. The action may be brought against any participants in
the hazing, any organization whose local or national directors, trustees,
or officers authorized, requested, commanded, or tolerated the hazing,
and any local or national director, trustee, or officer of the organization
who authorized, requested, commanded, or tolerated the hazing. If the
hazing involves students in a primary, secondary, or post-secondary
school, university, college, or any other educational institution, an action
may also be brought against any administrator, employee, or faculty member of the school, university, college, or other educational institution who
knew or reasonably should have known of the hazing and who did not
make reasonable attempts to prevent it and against the school, university,
college, or other educational institution. If an administrator, employee,
or faculty member is found liable in a civil action for hazing, then notwithstanding Chapter 2743. of the Revised Code, the school, university,
college, or other educational institution that employed the administrator,
employee, or faculty member may also be held liable. The negligence or
consent of the plaintiff or any assumption of the risk by the plaintiff is not
a defense to an action brought pursuant to this section. In an action
against a school, university, college, or other educational institution, it is
an affirmative defense that the school, university, college, or other institution was actively enforcing a policy against hazing at the time the cause of
action arose.
Id.
269. See GOLDBERG, supra note 88, at 476 (describing sovereign immunity).
270. See Pelham v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 743 S.E.2d 469,
471–72 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (noting resolution of summary judgment ruling).
271. See id. (finding no civil claim from violation of criminal statute).
272. See id. (finding no waiver of sovereign immunity and refusing to read one
into probable violation of criminal statute).
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forms of intentional conduct when holding a government entity or
employee liable.273 In Georgia, the state is not liable for the actions
of individuals when the theory of recovery stems from assault and
battery.274 The court in Pelham held that, because the underlying
cause of action stemmed from an assault and battery incident, the
exception to the state’s waiver applied, thus reinstating sovereign
immunity, and barring recovery.275 The plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that the coach committed hazing independently of the assault
and battery that created the cognizable injury, and thus the exception should not apply.276 The court disagreed, finding that the only
relevant act is the one that created the loss.277 This case emphasizes
the dangers of not having a distinct civil cause of action, as any act
of hazing will likely involve some form of intentional conduct not
covered by a state’s waiver of sovereign immunity.278
As seen in Pelham, negligence and negligence per se are not viable
when the underlying acts fall under an exception to a state’s waiver
of sovereign immunity.279 This failure has nothing to do with the
validity of negligence per se as a theory of liability, and everything to
do with the harsh realities of sovereign immunity—a constant problem when the liable party in a hazing incident works for the government.280 In the case of Ms. Hunt, she filed claims of negligence
and gross negligence, but not negligence per se, against the coach defendants.281 This specific cause of action likely stems from South
Carolina’s voluminous exceptions to the waiver of statutory immunity, which provides an exception for “responsibility or duty including but not limited to supervision [or] protection . . . of any
student . . . except when the responsibility or duty is exercised in a grossly
273. See id. at 472–73 (finding assault and battery exception to waiver of sovereign immunity applied).
274. See GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-24(7) (2015) (listing exceptions to state
waiver of sovereign immunity).
275. See Pelham, 743 S.E.2d at 472–73 (finding exception to waiver of sovereign immunity valid and applicable to facts of case).
276. See id. (describing plaintiff’s argument).
277. See id. (finding against plaintiff’s argument that coach did not commit
assault or battery).
278. See generally GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-24(7) (listing assault, battery, and
false imprisonment as exceptions to waiver).
279. See Pelham, 743 S.E.2d at 472 (attempting, and failing, to utilize negligence and negligence per se as theories of liability against school board).
280. See id. at 474 (noting harshness of sovereign immunity, particularly when
school employee was likely at fault).
281. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 114–21 (detailing cause of action against
coach defendants).
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negligent manner[.]”282 The fact that a plaintiff must limit her claims
and jump through definitional hoops before she can even hope to
pierce sovereign immunity is a compelling argument in favor of
both state-based exceptions for hazing and an explicit § 1983 exception for when the underlying conduct constitutes hazing.
V. CONCLUSION
In many respects, hazing is a well-established custom, stemming from civilizing processes aimed at cultivating an individual
into a proper member of the university.283 In the modern sense, it
remains utterly pervasive in the school setting, yet trades the civilizing aspect for faux camaraderie.284 Despite the stereotypes, the
greatest prevalence is not in Greek fraternities and sororities, but in
sports.285 Hazing is so pervasive that it is difficult to believe that
there are more than a handful of student athletes who have not
experienced it in some form or another, even if they do not recognize that they had been hazed.286 While some acts of hazing are
seemingly harmless, the instances of sexual abuse, permanent injury, and death are all too common.287
When hazing does occur, it rarely results in punishment of any
kind.288 While the vast majority of states have adopted statutes that
criminalize hazing, these laws are so diverse and ineffective that
they are functionally useless, and are generally incapable of making
any meaningful difference in the world of hazing.289 Even when a
law recognizes the diverse nature of hazing, it often fails to introduce reliable means of enforcement against anyone beyond the stu282. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(25) (2015) (emphasis added) (listing one of
many exceptions to waiver of sovereign immunity).
283. See STOP HAZING, History, http://www.stophazing.org/hazing-information/history/ (describing historical origins of hazing).
284. See Nuwer, supra note 14 (discussing illusion of bonding that accompanies hazing by students).
285. See Allan, supra note 12, at 15–16 (listing prevalence of hazing by type of
organization and noting that varsity athletic teams are most likely to experience
hazing).
286. See id. at 29–30 (discussing reasons why students do not report hazing,
such as being unaware that activity constituted hazing, or disagreeing that activity
was hazing).
287. For further discussion on some of the extreme acts of hazing, see supra
notes 50-73 and accompanying text.
288. See generally Chamberlin, supra note 7, at 944 (discussing general ineffectiveness of anti-hazing laws in United States).
289. For further discussion on hazing laws, see supra notes 16–49 and accompanying text.
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dent who committed the specific acts in question.290 Lack of
inchoate and third-party liability, along with an inability to target
schools and coaches, leaves many anti-hazing laws impotent.291 The
lack of explicit civil liability is also extremely problematic, as it prevents many civil litigants from piercing the sovereign immunity that
protects governmental actors, leaving them without remedy against
some of the worst perpetrators of the harm.292
The blame does not lie squarely on the states; even federal law
has its flaws, such as the inability to succeed under a § 1983 claim
without meeting various thresholds of conduct and relationships.293
The continued weakening of the theory of in loco parentis, the special relationship exception, and the state-created danger doctrine
make it unlikely that coaches will ever be liable under federal law
unless they acted directly against the student.294 Even when a
coach does act directly, that liability does not often transfer to the
school that employed the coach.295
Any attempts at litigation must weave a circuitous route around
these various problems; finding liability under the general laws, to
the exclusion of the anti-hazing statutes, may prove the most viable
option under the limited scope of hazing liability.296 Even when a
litigant uses those anti-hazing laws, circumstances may require turning to general principles of criminal and civil law to create inchoate
and third-party liability.297 States, as well as the federal government, must be the ones to act before true liability attaches to acts of
hazing, including the allowance, direction, and solicitation of
hazing.298
290. For further discussion on the issues of enforcing anti-hazing laws, see
supra notes 163–2210 and accompanying text.
291. For further discussion on the issues of inchoate liability, third-party liability, and non-student actors, see supra notes 163–210 and accompanying text.
292. For further discussion on the issue of sovereign immunity, see supra
notes 87–108 and accompanying text.
293. For further discussion on federal § 1983 claims, see supra notes 109–59
and accompanying text.
294. For further discussion on theories of liability against coaches, see supra
notes 109–59 and accompanying text.
295. For further discussion on the weaknesses of imputing liability on the inaction of schools, see supra notes 109–59 and accompanying text.
296. For further discussion on the weaknesses of liability under state anti-hazing laws, see supra notes 160–210 and accompanying text.
297. For further discussion on alternative approaches to liability, see supra
notes 160–210 and accompanying text.
298. For further discussion on the need for government action to address
hazing liability, see supra notes 205–10 and accompanying text.
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Hazing as a problem will likely continue to exist well into the
future; it is a staple of sports and college life, and it is a tradition
that coaches pass down and establish to students of subsequent generations.299 Anti-hazing laws are frankly too little, too late, and do
not provide criminal or civil penalties, responsibility, or liability to
any meaningful degree.300 Change must occur at both the state
and the federal levels. There must be uniformity, proper recognition of the broad scope of what constitutes hazing, and recognition
that the individuals most at fault are not necessarily the ones holding the paddle or the bottle of alcohol. Schools and coaches cannot hide behind sovereign immunity, because they are in the best
position to fix this problem before it starts.301
Even if a state government does not want to foot the bill for the
misconduct of coaches, they can at a minimum substitute civil liability for criminal sanctions. It is unlikely that coaches will continue
endorsing and promoting hazing when their fellow coaches find
themselves sitting behind bars. At the same time, the federal government is in a position of power; they have less personal interest in
protecting a state government from state action, and can provide
explicit remedies and the removal of immunities for acts of hazing.
It is a common refrain to think of the children, yet this is one case
where we simply must care for our student athletes—no matter how
old they may be. Even putting aside the issue of whether schools
use these students as unpaid marketing tools and for-profit entertainment, school sports are dangerous enough to begin with.
There is simply no excuse for increasing that danger in the
locker rooms, the dorms, and after the stadium lights go out. While
the chances may yet be slim, individuals such as Ms. Hunt should be
lauded for taking a brave stand against their oppressors. With increased awareness and pressure against the government, we may yet
see a reform in anti-hazing laws and practices. Until then, hazing
victims must do what they can—one lawsuit at a time.
Nicholas Bittner*
299. See generally Nuwer, supra note 14 (describing nature of team culture as
deriving from coaches and athletic directors).
300. For further discussion on the inadequacies of anti-hazing laws and their
related penalties, see supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text.
301. See generally Nuwer, supra note 14 (noting that positive change flows from
coaches).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; B.A. Criminal Justice, January 2013, Temple University; author of The Bitter
Road: A Treatise on Diacritical Nihilism and The Roads Around Religion: Finding
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